Space-Based Offensive Weapons: Have policymakers discussed this enough?

Kathleen M. Sweet, J. D., Lt. Col. (Ret.) USAF
Associate Professor,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
August 2003

Introduction

Full spectrum dominance depends on the inherent strengths of modern space power-speed, global range, stealth, flexibility, precision, lethality, global theater situational awareness and strategic perspective.
- Air Force White Paper, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force [1]

Arguably, one of the most significant global security policy debates of the 21st century is whether the United States and more specifically the Bush Administration should develop and deploy space-based weaponry. The age of space is upon us. But how convinced is the rest of America, the West and potential adversaries of the legitimate need to do so? For almost half a century, the world’s space powers have abstained from deploying such weapons as basic unwritten policy.

To date, the military has been limited to surveillance, navigation and communications satellites. In June 2001, Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Ryan was quoted as saying, “Eventually we’re going to have to have the capability to take things out in orbit.” [2]
Source: iraqdaily.com

His argument is based on the premise that historically, wherever commerce has gone so does US national interest and, subsequently, the requirement to protect that interest. This rationale for the deployment of offensive space weaponry should elicit much debate, especially as our military is reduced in size. Policymakers and institutions of higher learning need to address this issue before the “Final Frontier” becomes a battlefield. To neglect the topic and let the militarization of space happen out of apathy will be to relinquish any input over a decision, which could potentially destroy the planet.

The technological revolution of the late twentieth century has provided the US military an incredible conventional offensive force and altered forever the way war can and will be waged. In March 2002, Paul Teets, Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the Pentagon’s lead procurement officer for space programs, stated, “I believe that weapons will go into space. It’s a question of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that.” [3]

Teets has a significant baseline to work from to effectuate this concept. The advent of precision- guided munitions has provided war fighters, for example, with ordnance accuracies measured as Circular Errors of Probability (CEPs) on the order of a few feet.
Source:www.af.mil

Newer weapons including laser guided bombs, Global Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions, and Tomahawk missiles have given military forces an immense capability that will assist in the defeat of any known enemy and, if used correctly, with minimum collateral damage and civilian casualties. Yet, this certainly is just the beginning of the revolution. The trend will be toward even more precise and lethal weapons systems, often unmanned or minimally manned, and able to respond within seconds to attack targets anywhere on earth. On this basis, space seems to offer significant advantages in future warfare, and, currently, the US government is actively pursuing research on spaced based laser and kinetic weapons.

This paper will seek to provide some perspective on the necessity of such pursuits and the possible consequences of rushing in without thinking. The discussion will describe the types of offensive space-based weapons most likely to be developed and deployed in the early 21st Century as well as the potential impact on US military force structure, roles and missions, and doctrine. Clearly, the military has accepted that conflict in space is now inevitable and is preparing for it. The stabilizing or destabilizing impact on the world security environment, from an academic perspective, will also be addressed.

Historical Developments

Arguably, the militarization of space commenced with the launch of the Soviet Union's Sputnik satellite in 1957. In the early stages of the Cold War, both sides began competing in space to conquer and use space for the benefit of military forces. President Dwight Eisenhower's response to Sputnik was rather muted especially in relation to the public outcry over the event.
Sputnik 1. Science Museum, London/ Science & Society Picture Library

He personally believed that the public's concern was unwarranted; failing thus to act quickly to equal the Soviet Union's effort, he ensured America's second place position in space for the near term. [4] More recently, the Clinton Administration’s philosophy of a restrained approach has been replaced with the Bush Administration’s unquestioning acceptance of exploitation of space for military purposes.

The separation of military and civilian space programs became codified in July 1958 with the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which formally created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The US effort was focused toward peaceful scientific and commercial applications. Later, when President John F. Kennedy decided to engage in the race to place a man on the moon, the effort assumed a priority position and the military quickly recognized they were losing potential funding.

Military efforts in space did exist and were supported and characterized as “peaceful” missions. The advent of reconnaissance satellites brought one of those peaceful missions to the forefront following the downing of a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in May 1960. Officially, US space policy evolved from the advocacy of the non-military use of space to one of non-aggressive use of space. [5]

In order to legally continue the programs, the US began to seek confirming international agreements. The idea was not new and incorporated Eisenhower's "Open Skies" initiative. The former Soviet Union rejected the entire concept to allow free over flights of each other's country to verify the location and numbers of nuclear weapons. [6]

Even though the major powers were not in agreement, they continued to experiment but not deploy. Gradually both the Soviet Union and the US expanded military space programs but still restrained themselves from actively using technology capable of shooting down satellites from the ground, sea or air. Nonetheless, trepidation about Soviet threats to place nuclear weapons in orbit led Eisenhower to propose a ban on nuclear weapons in space as early as September 1960. The Soviets agreed, which led to a bilateral agreement to ban nuclear weapons testing from outer space. Specifically, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies; including the moon.

Additionally, the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems banned either side form interfering with the other’s spy satellites. Both of these important documents continue to have considerable influence on the current debate because both the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty served to reinforce the self-restraint on the deployment of military space weaponry that Eisenhower advanced. The end of the first Cold War precipitated a reevaluation of current policy.

In the 1990’s, National Security Council (NSC) Directive 5520, dated 26 May 1995, recommended separating the US space effort from ongoing military programs to develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). This directive worked to disengage the military from satellite development programs and diverted monies to ICBM programs. Six years later in April 2001, prior to 9/11, the Transformation Study Report, drafted for the Office of the Secretary of Defense reasoned that, “ Space capabilities are inherently global, unaffected by territorial boundaries or jurisdictional limitations; they provide direct access to all regions, and with our advanced technologies, give us a highly asymmetrical advantage over any potential adversary. [7]

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Issue No 6

Winter 2004

Satellite Security

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